Abstract. In this paper we consider some cryptographic implications of integrated circuit (IC) printing. While still in its infancy, IC-printing allows the production and personalisation of circuits at very low cost. In this paper we present two block ciphers PRINTcipher-48 and PRINTcipher-96 that are designed to exploit the properties of IC-printing technology and we further extend recent advances in lightweight block cipher design.
Introduction
New technologies open new applications and often bring challenging new problems at the same time. Most recently, advances in device manufacture have opened the possibility for extremely low-cost RFID tags. However, at the same time, their exceptional physical and economic constraints mean that we must leave behind much of our conventional cryptography. This has spurred the development of the field of lightweight cryptography. This paper considers another technological advance, that of integrated circuit printing or IC-printing. Using silicon inks, circuits can quite literally be printed onto a range of materials using high-definition printing processes. The technology remains in its infancy and its true potential is yet to be fully understood. But the claimed advantages include the ability to print on to thin and flexible materials and, since the conventional fabrication process is by-passed, to be much cheaper than silicon-based deployments [19] . Since the main driver for IC-printing is economic, the typically-cited areas of application overlap closely with the typical domains for lightweight cryptography. Indeed, one of the oft-stated applications of IC-printing is in the fabrication of cheap RFID tags [13] . Therefore there is much in common between some of the techniques proposed for conventional RFID tags and those that will be used on printed tags.
However IC-printing has some interesting properties and these allow us to take a fresh look at our cryptography and to see how it might be adapted to this new field. In this paper, therefore, we consider the task of adding some simple security functionality to a printed tag, and following what has now become a reasonably well-trodden path, we start out with the design of a block cipher.
Block ciphers make a natural starting point for several reasons. Not only can they be used in many different ways, but as a community we feel somewhat more at ease with their design and analysis. That said, for such extreme environments as IC-printing, we are working right at the edge of established practice and we are forced to consider and highlight some interesting problems. This is the purpose behind the block cipher PRINTcipher.
Just as for other constrained environments, the size of implementation will be a dominant issue in IC-printing. Our work will therefore have close links with other block cipher work in the field of lightweight cryptanalysis. In fact our starting point for the work in this paper will be the block cipher present [1] which appears to offer a range of design/implementation trade-offs. However we will re-examine the structure of present in the particular context of IC-printing.
Conceptually we can imagine that within a block cipher we need an "encryption computation" and a "subkey computation". For the first, there are limits to the short-cuts we can make since we are constrained by the attentions of the cryptanalyst. This means, for the most part, that proposals for a given security level and a given set of block cipher parameters would occupy pretty much the same space. If we wanted to reduce the space occupied by an implementation then we would most likely reduce the block size, something that has been proposed independently elsewhere [2] . However, for the "subkey computation" things are a little different and exactly how a key should be used is not always clear. This highlights two separate issues.
The first issue is whether a key is likely to be changed in an application. In fact there is probably not too much debate about this issue and many commentators over the years [1, 21] have made the point that for RFID applications it is very unlikely that one would want to change the key. Indeed some other RFID implementation work [20] has demonstrated that the overhead in supporting a change of key can be significant.
The second issue is the exact form of the key schedule. Some block ciphers, e.g. idea [14] , have a very simple key schedule in which subkeys are created by sampling bits of the usersupplied key. This is, in effect, the approach used in the ktantan family of ciphers. The advantage of this approach is that no working memory is needed for the subkey computations. Other lightweight block ciphers have some key schedule computation, e.g. present, while another proposal cgen [21] proposes to use no key schedule; the user-supplied key is used without any sampling or additional computation.
Returning to the situation at hand, conventional silicon manufacturing uses lithographic techniques to massively duplicate an implementation across a silicon wafer. This gives the economy of scale to offset the fabrication costs but at the same time requires that all implementations are identical. In this paper, we take advantage of the properties of IC-printing to propose another approach. Regular IC manufacture requires all versions of the cipher to be identical and so while a specific tag can be personalised with a unique key, this is a postfabrication step. With a printer, however, there is essentially no cost in changing the circuit that is printed at each run. This means that part-or all-of the secret key can be embedded into the algorithm description. The algorithms that appear on different printed labels will be subtly different from one another.
The PRINTcipher family was designed with this approach in mind. PRINTcipher-48 is a 48-bit block cipher which uses a fixed 48-bit secret key and derives an additional 32 bits of security via the secret algorithm variability. Different trade-offs can be established either reducing the effective security, say to 64 bits, and/or independently increasing the block size to 96 bits. In fact this is a particularly useful block size since it matches the length of an electronic product code (EPC) [5] . However we will tend to concentrate our attentions in this paper on two proposals PRINTcipher-48 and PRINTcipher-96. Given the amount of work in the area of block ciphers, some points of similarity with other proposals in the literature are inevitable. For instance, 3-bit S-boxes have been used in 3-way [4] and the Scaleable Encryption Algorithm (SEA) [26] while key-dependent algorithm features have appeared in a variety of block ciphers including Blowfish [24] , Twofish [25] , and GOST [10] .
3 PRINTcipher-48 and PRINTcipher-96
One round of PRINTcipher-48 illustrating the bit-mapping between the 16 3-bit S-boxes from one round to the next. The first subkey is used in the first xor, the round counter is denoted RCi, while keydependent permutations are used at the input to each S-box.
PRINTcipher is a block cipher with b-bit blocks, b ∈ {48, 96}, and an effective key length of 3 × b bits long. The first subkey is used, unchanged, within the xor layer of each and every round.
The second subkey sk 2 is used to generate the key-dependent permutations in the following way. The 2 3 × b-bits are divided into b 3 sets of two bits and each two-bit quantity a 1 ||a 0 is used to pick one of four of the six available permutations of the three input bits. Specifically, the three input bits c 2 ||c 1 ||c 0 are permuted to give the following output bits according to the value of a 1 ||a 0 . Of course one can combine the bitwise permutation with the fixed S-box to give, conceptually, four virtual S-boxes. These are given below and testvectors for both PRINTcipher variants can be found in the appendix. 
Security goals
Our security goals behind PRINTcipher are the usual security claims for a block cipher with the operational parameters of PRINTcipher. Note that in the case of PRINTcipher-48 even though we have a regular sized 80-bit key, we only have a 48-bit block cipher and this greatly limits the opportunities for an attacker.
We follow much of the established literature on lightweight cryptography and do not consider side-channel attacks in this paper. While this is certainly a factor for consideration, typical applications are very low-cost and the potential gains for an attacker are minor. Even in a relatively well-developed field such as RFID tags for the supply chain it is not clear what level of protection is really appropriate for most deployments of lightweight cryptography. For IC-printing this is even more unclear, and there are some concerns that are particular to IC-printing for which appropriate precautions will likely be needed, such as the use of opaque masks to shield the circuit from simple inspection. Note that, shielding protection is not exclusively an issue for PRINTcipher where the key is part of the circuit, but also for more standard ciphers where the key is stored in memory, as it is in principle possible to inspect memory in similar ways (see for example [23] ) .
Where we differ from some other work in the field, however, is that for PRINTcipher we are not particularly concerned by related-key attacks. This is not because we believe that PRINTcipher is in some way particularly vulnerable to them (see Section 4.3 for details).
Instead it is because we believe that related-key attacks are so alien to the intended use of PRINTcipher that there is no point in considering them. Recall that a (printed) device will be initialised with a key in a random way. To mount a related-key attack one has to somehow find a pair of deployed devices that, by chance, satisfy a stated condition. We consider this to be an entirely unrealistic threat.
Some features of the design
During the design of PRINTcipher there were some interesting choices to make. Certainly, to improve the implementation efficiency we required that each round was identical, even as far as having an identical subkey in each round. However having the same round key in every round meant that we were restricted to 48-bit keys. So to increase the effective key length we used some additional permutation steps that could be key-dependent. Permutations cost nothing in hardware and, for our application of IC-printing, they incur effectively no additional cost during the printing of the cipher. It can be shown that there are no equivalent keys in the sense that there are no two pairs of subkey components (sk 1 , sk 2 ) that will yield the same round function. Note that since every round is identical-to the point of having the same round key-we needed to introduce a round-dependent value to prevent slide attacks and this was done using a shift register-based counter as outlined above.
The S-box The 3-bit S-box that we chose is optimal with respect to linear and differential properties. However we cannot avoid the existence of single-bit to single-bit differences or masks and so our specific choice of S-box minimizes there occurrence. That is, for a given single-bit input difference (resp. mask) exactly one single-bit output difference (resp. mask) occurs with non-zero probability (resp. non-zero bias). We generated all 3-bit S-boxes with this property and it turns out that there are exactly 384 such S-boxes in total.
Clearly, permuting the input bits and (xor) adding constants before or after the S-box preserves the desired properties. Up to these changes, there is only one possible choice of S-box, i.e. all 384 S-boxes fulfilling the desired criteria can be constructed from any one of them by permuting the input bits and adding constants before and after the S-box (indeed 384 = 6 · 2 3 · 2 3 ).
Thus in the design of PRINTcipher there is, in effect, only one suitable choice of Sbox. Choosing any other of the 384 possible S-boxes would result in the same cipher for a different key, up to an additional xor with a constant to the plaintext and the ciphertext. More formally, given two S-boxes S 0 , S 1 out of the 384 possible choices and any key (sk 1 , sk 2 ) there exist a key (sk ′ 1 , sk ′ 2 ) and constants c 1 , c 2 such that
for any plaintext p.
Those observations imply another interesting property of the S-box of PRINTcipher. Namely, instead of permuting the input bits of the S-box one could permute the output bits of the S-box and xor suitable constants before and after the S-box. More precisely, denoting the PRINTcipher S-box by S, for any bit permutation P , there exist constants c and d such that
Note that, while this might give some freedom in implementing the cipher we did not see any security implications of this.
The bit permutation We choose the permutation so as to give the potential for full dependency after a minimal number of rounds, i.e. after 4 = ⌈log 3 48⌉ rounds. Note that in general, given an SP-network with block size b and s bit Sboxes, where s divides b, it can be shown that the bit permutation
provides optimal diffusion in the sense that full dependency is reached after ⌈log s b⌉ rounds. The bit permutation -or rather its inverse -used for the block cipher present is a special case of this general result.
Security Analysis
In this section we analyze the security of our proposal with respect to the main cryptanalytic methods known. Though we focus on PRINTcipher-48, the security analysis can be easily extended to PRINTcipher-96.
Differential and linear characteristics
Let p be the probability of a linear characteristic, then define the correlation of the linear characteristic as q = (2p − 1) 2 [18] . As mentioned above, the S-box in PRINTcipher was chosen with good differential and linear properties. These properties are inherited by the other three virtual S-boxes, and so if we combine the key-dependent permutation with the S-box operation any differential characteristic over any S-box has a probability of at most 1/4, and any linear characteristic over any S-box has a correlation of at most 1/4. Any characteristic over s rounds of PRINTcipher would have at least one active Sbox per round. Consequently, an s-round differential characteristic will have a probability of at most 2 −2s and any s-round linear characteristic will have a correlation of at most 2 −2s . Thus, conventional differential and linear characteristics are unlikely to play a role in the cryptanalysis of PRINTcipher with the specified 48 respectively 96 rounds.
We furthermore experimentally checked for differential effects, i.e., the probability of differentials compared to the probability of characteristics. Consider the following one-round iterative characteristic (octal representation): Only the S-box in the least significant bits is active. This characteristic has probability 1/4 when the active S-box is V 0 or V 1 . The iterative characteristic above has an expected probability of 2 −24 for 12 rounds.
We implemented experiments with 20 keys, each randomly chosen but such that the S-box in the least significant bits is either V 0 or V 1 . For each key we generated 2 28 pairs of texts of the above difference. The number of pairs of the expected difference after 12 rounds of encryption was 16.6 on the average, where 16 is expected for the characteristic. In similar tests over 14 rounds using 2 30 pairs, the average number of pairs obtained was 4.5 on average, where 4 was expected. Here the expected probability of the iterative characteristic is 2 −28 . These tests suggest that there is no significant differential effect for the characteristic. Computing the exact differential effect for a characteristic over many more rounds of PRINTcipher is a very complex task. However since the probability of the iterative characteristic is very low, e.g. 2 −80 for 40 rounds, we expect that good probability differentials are unlikely to exist for PRINTcipher.
High order differentials and algebraic attacks
The algebraic degree of the S-box is 2 and due to the large number of 48 rounds we expect the total degree of the cipher to be close to the maximum. This assumption is supported by the following experiments. It is well-known that for a function of algebraic degree d, a d thorder differential will be a constant, and the value of a (d + 1) st -order differential will be zero. Consequently, if a d th -order differential over s rounds for one key is not zero, then the algebraic degree of this encryption function is at least d − 1. For seven rounds of PRINTcipher and for ten randomly chosen keys we computed the values of two different 25 th -order differentials. In all cases the values were nonzero. The experiments suggest that the algebraic degree of PRINTcipher reaches its maximum after much less than the specified 48 rounds. Due to this observations, we expect PRINTcipher to be secure against higher order differential attacks.
Regarding the so-called algebraic attacks, first observe that there exist quadractic equations over all 3-bit S-boxes, also those of PRINTcipher. Therefore, the secret key of one particular encryption can be described as the solution to a number of quadratic equations. However such a system of equation for PRINTcipher will be huge because of the large number of rounds, and with the techniques known today, there is not much hope that such systems can be solved in time faster than simply trying all values of the key. Moreover, the key dependent permutations potentially make the resulting systems of equation even more complex and harder to solve.
Related-key attacks
As stated above, we consider related-key attacks to be an entirely unrealistic threat. However, in the spirit of academic completeness, we consider the issue here.
The four S-boxes in PRINTcipher are closely related. As an example, S-box 0 and Sbox 1 produce the same output for each of four inputs and similarly for S-boxes 2 and 3 and for S-boxes 4 and 5. Consider two keys different only in the selection of one S-box, say, the leftmost one. Assume further that one key selects S-box V 0 and the other key selects S-box V 1 . It follows that for one round of encryption, the encryption function induced by the two keys will be equal for half the inputs. Consequently, the encryption functions over s rounds can be expected to produce identical ciphertexts for one in 2 s texts. There are other related keys. Consider two keys different only in xor halves and only in the input to one S-box. For such two keys it may be possible to specify a keyed differential characteristic where the differences in the texts are canceled by the differences in the xor key in every second round. If in all other rounds it is assumed that there is only one active S-box and that the difference in the inputs equal the difference in the outputs, then one gets an s-round differential characteristic of probability 2 −s (for even s).
The observations in this section can potentially be used to devise related-key attacks which could recover a key for PRINTcipher using a little less than 2 b texts. It is clear, however, that if the keys of PRINTcipher are chosen uniformly at random it is very unlikely that one would find keys related as described above.
Statistical Saturation Attacks
Statistical saturation attacks have been presented in [3] and successfully applied to roundreduced versions of present. The key idea for statistical saturation attacks is to make use of low diffusion trails in the linear layer of present. As PRINTcipher uses a very similar linear layer, it seems natural that the attack applies to reduced round versions of PRINTcipher as well. We identified low diffusion trails for any number of S-boxes involved, see Table 1 for examples of the most promising ones using up to eight S-boxes in a trail. One example of such a low diffusion trail is given below.
As explained in [3] increasing the number of S-boxes in the trail makes estimating the complexity of the attack very complicated. Thus, in our experiments we focused only on the case of three active S-boxes in the trail. All four possible trails gave very similar results. We estimated the bias for 50 randomly chosen keys for up to 10 rounds and for 20 randomly chosen keys for up to 15 rounds. Table 2 and Figure 2 show the squared euclidian distance between the distribution in the trail and the uniform distribution. The data complexity for attacking r + 3, resp. r + 4 rounds, depending on how many key bits are guessed, is approximately the reciprocal of the squared euclidian distance for r rounds. While our experiments are certainly limited, the results strongly suggest that no more than 30 rounds of PRINTcipher can be broken using this attack. Fig. 2 . The estimated squared bias with the number of rounds on the x-axis and the log 2 of the squared bias given on the y-axis.
Implementation Results
To demonstrate the efficiency of our proposal we have implemented both PRINTcipher variants in VHDL and used Synopsys DesignVision 2007.12 [27] to synthesize them using the Virtual Silicon (VST) standard cell library UMCL18G212T3, which is based on the UMC L180 0.18µm 1P6M logic process and has a typical voltage of 1.8 Volt [29] . Before presenting the results we stress the unique deployment environment offered by IC-printing. While our implementation efforts allow us to obtain a reasonable estimate of the space required, in terms of gate equivalents (GE), for an IC-printing implementation of PRINTcipher, any attempts to compare the likely power consumption with other implementations of lightweight cryptography are not just difficult (as is usually the case), but they are essentially meaningless. For this reason our performance results and comparisons will concentrate on the space occupied by an implementation. Figure 3 depicts two architectures that were implemented: a serialized one with a datapath of 3-bits and a round-based one with a datapath of 48 or 96 bits. Components that contain mainly sequential logic are presented in rectangles while purely combinational components are presented in ovals.
The first serialized implementation of PRINTcipher-48 used a finite state machine (FSM) that required 120 GE out of which 95 GE were occupied by two arithmetic counters: 59 GE were occupied by the 6-bit round counter and additional 36 GE were required for a 4-bit counter to keep track of the 3-bit chunks of the serialized state. Similar to KATAN [2] we replaced the arithmetic round counter by a shift register-based counter, which saved 28 GE (or 47%) while having better distribution properties. The second counter was also replaced by a register-based counter which decreased the gate count by another 12 GE (35%). Finally we completely omitted the FSM and replaced it with some combinatorial gates to generate the control signals required (e.g. for the MUX). In total, by omitting the FSM and optimizing the control logic, we were able to save 54 GE (45%).
As part of our quest for a minimal S-box, we used the Boolean minimization tool BOOM II [7, 8] to obtain the boolean functions of all 48 S-box variants that can be generated from a 3-bit S-box, by permuting the output bits and XORing a hardwired constant. Our synthesis results show that the results vary between 10.67 and 12 GE, and we chose a minimal S-box.
In order to be able to present a detailed break down for each component of PRINTcipher (see the accompanying table), we advised the compiler to compile simple, i.e. to keep the hierarchy of the components. The smallest area footprint is achieved, however, if the compiler uses the compile ultra command, which allows the merging and optimization of different components simultaneously. Since the key xor is hardwired, the area requirements for the KeyXOR component are dependent on the Hamming weight of the key. The implementation figures of Figure 4 used a key with Hamming weight 24, thus the area footprint of a serialized implementation of PRINTcipher-48 is bounded by 386 GE and 418 GE for keys with Hamming weight 0 and 48, respectively (694 GE and 758 GE for that both PRINTcipher variants scale nicely; by spending more area for additional S-boxes, the throughput can be scaled (nearly) linearly. At this point it is noteworthy to highlight the significant overhead (43 GE or 10.5%) that is required for additional control logic in a serialized PRINTcipher-48 implementation. This shows that it is hard to gain further area reductions. Furthermore, note that a 6-bit xor with the round constant RC i requires the same area as the 48-bit hardwired xor with a key with a typical Hamming weight of 24.
While observing our earlier caveats about the use of power estimates in the context of IC-printing, we did make some measurements for the likely power consumption of more conventional silicon-based implementations. We used Synopsys PowerCompiler version A-2007.12-SP1 [28] to estimate the performance of our implementations. Measurements using the smallest wire-load model (10K GE) at a supply voltage of 1.8 Volt and a frequency of 100 KHz suggested a power consumption below 2.6 µW; a good indication that all PRINTcipher variants are well-suited to demanding applications including printed passive RFID tags. It is a well-known fact that at low frequencies, as typical for low-cost applications, the power consumption is dominated by its static part, which is proportional to the amount of transistors involved. Furthermore, the power consumption strongly depends on the used technology and greatly varies with the simulation method. Thus we refer to the area figures (in GE) as the most important measure and to have a fair comparison we do not include the power values in Table 3 . Table 3 compares a selection of lightweight block and stream cipher implementations that have been optimized for a minimal area footprint. It can be seen that the serialized implementation of PRINTcipher requires the least amount of area for its block and key sizes (402 GE). Moreover, spending additional 100 GE (or 25%) the throughput can be increased 16 fold to 100 Kpbs at a frequency of 100 KHz, while still having a remarkably small area footprint. The resulting throughput per area ratio of 198.8 Kpbs per GE is even suited for high-speed applications though our main focus is on a low area footprint.
It is noteworthy to stress that we designed PRINTcipher to be secure even in the absence of a key schedule. This allows for significant area savings, because no flipflops to store the key state are required. Of course one could hardwire all the roundkeys for any cipher with a key schedule and, theoretically, this would allow for similar savings. In practice, however, this is not the case. Since all low-area implementations are serialized or round-based designs, one needs complex additional logic to select the right roundkey or even the right part of the roundkey. For a serialized AES for example, one would need a 128-bit wide 11-to-1 MUX to select the correct roundkey plus an 8-bit wide 16-to-1 MUX to select the right chunk of the roundkey. Our experiments reveal that a 128-bit wide 8-to-1 MUX already consumes 1276 GE, which makes it more efficient to store the key state in flipflops (768 GE) than to hardwire the roundkeys.
Though they have not been the focus of our design, for those interested in software implementations we estimate the performance of PRINTcipher on a 64-bit platform to be around 5-10 times slower than an optimized AES implementation: merging the permutation and using 6-bit S-boxes could give an implementation with 9-12 cycles per round. With 48 rounds this amounts to 72-95 cycles per byte while AES runs in 10-20 cycles per byte.
Conclusions
In this paper we have considered the technology of IC-printing and we have seen how it might influence the cryptography that we use. In particular we have proposed the lightweight block cipher PRINTcipher that explicitly takes advantage of this new manufacturing approach. Naturally it must be emphasized that PRINTcipher-48 is intended to be an object of research rather than being suitable for deployment. It is also intended to be a spur to others who might be interested in considering this new technology. Certainly we believe that the properties of IC-printing could be an interesting line of work and we feel that it helps to highlight several intriguing problems in cryptographic design, most notably how best to use a cipher key.
